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NOTES AND NEWS

LETTER FROM DR. SCHILLER

TO THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS:

As Professor J. P. Turner has done me the honor to quote, in his review of Mr. D. L. Murray's "Pragmatism,"¹ from my preface to that work a fragment which stops short of the point of my argument, *viz.*, that given a certain sort and degree of intelligence there is nothing like an intellectualistic education to develop "a perception of the *intellectual necessity* of Pragmatism" and to opine that it deserves a wide circulation, may I point out that his quotation is not quite accurate and may possibly mislead? I did not ascribe to the British nation a contempt for "the pure intellect", but for "pure intellect", and pointed to the practical success of administrators selected by an examination so gloriously irrelevant to their "future duties" as that for the British, and, until recently, that for the Chinese, Civil Service. But though I noted the paradox, I did not dispute the success, and it should, in my opinion, be a serious concern of political philosophers to account for the success of the

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. XI., page 24.

mandarinate in governing China for three thousand years and in attaining a stability so much in excess of any that usually befalls the institutions of man.

Very truly yours,
F. C. S. SCHILLER.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY,
February 3, 1914.

AT a meeting of the British Academy on January 28, Professor S. Alexander read a paper on "The Basis of Realism." By insisting on the equal claim of objects with the mind to be considered real, realism seems at first sight to depress the mind, and make it less real. But this misapprehension rests upon the mistake of confusing reality with perfection. Mind is not more real than things, but more perfect, *i. e.*, more developed. In view of Mr. Bosanquet's recent criticism of realism (Adamson Lecture, 1913), and to show that by depriving mind of its pretensions realism actually establishes the perfection of mind, it seemed well to restate the position. The starting-point is the analysis of an act of cognition into an act of mind, its independent objects, and their compresence. This is not the mere distinction of act from object, but is only understood as the distinction of an enjoying subject from a contemplated object, separate from it. This latter distinction is thus the more important. This initial proposition of realism is "naive" and incomplete. When further examined, it turns out to be a particular case of the compresence of interrelated reals cohering within a universe. Two consequences of the analysis may be stated. First, mind is a continuum of mental functions which are also brain functions of a certain degree of development, with the mental quality. Being mind or consciousness is a new empirical quality which emerges at a particular stage. The mind is thus located in the brain. Secondly, the alleged distinction of "contents" of sense from the "objects" of thought disappears. The difference is one of part and whole. In each case there is an object, and not a "content." Reasons were assigned to account for the contrary view. But Mr. Bosanquet has urged that the analysis fails, because a mind is a world, while its object is a fragment. If this were so, the analysis from which realism starts would be false from the beginning. But in fact the mind is as much a fragment as the object, and the object is in the same sense a world as the mind (and neither is). His further objection that the analysis fails to account for the riches of mind, its wealth of being, or for tertiary qualities like beauty, was examined, and it was shown (*a*) that the riches of mind are unaffected; they are but a complex of processes and tendencies, always compresent with their objects; and (*b*) that the reality, and the more perfect reality, which is mind, enters as a constituent into beauty. It was then shown that while objects are independent of the mind, the mind is in a certain sense dependent on objects, or rather implies them. But again, to suppose that this minimizes the self-existence of mind is to confuse independence with isolation. The very lateness of mind in the order of development is the condition of its perfection. But the most searching

objection to realism is that its objects are mere abstractions and dead; whereas it is urged they already imply mind, and things are thus continuous in kind with mind. Now, according to realism, objects have all the fundamental characters, of continuity, retention, and the like, which can be seen more easily and flagrantly in minds. Thus the objection confuses the specific characters of minds with the categorical, fundamental characters which are common to minds with things. It may indeed be said, metaphorically, that all finites are minds; but this is inexact; and at any rate it does not mean that things are "mind," but only that they are different ranks of empirical existences, called minds, because in a certain sense they "know," that is, are compresent with, one another. This led to an attempt to define the larger issues between realism and (absolute) idealism. For in the case of the latter, things are transformed in entering into the one, individual whole. But for realism, things in certain respects at least (intrinsic ones) remain in the whole what they are already. The whole is not the only reality, but the most complete, or perfect reality, in a second sense of perfection.—*Athenaeum*.

THE Experimental Psychologists will meet this year at Columbia University on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, April 9 to 11. The scientific sessions will be preceded by a dinner on Wednesday evening, April 8, in honor of Professor James McKeen Cattell.

PROFESSOR THOMAS H. HAINES, of Ohio State University, who is on leave of absence, is conducting the courses in psychology at Smith College during the present semester.

DR. GEORGE R. M. WELLS, of Oberlin College, has been advanced to an associate professorship of psychology.

THE Western Philosophical Association will hold its annual meeting at the University of Chicago, Thursday and Friday, April 9 and 10, in connection with the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy, which is to occur at Chicago, April 10 and 11. It is proposed to devote the session of Thursday afternoon to a discussion of the Neo-Realistic Doctrine of Relations. The President's address will be given Thursday evening. At the session Friday morning, Professor Fite will lead a discussion of the subject of Natural Rights. On Friday afternoon the Association will hold a joint session with the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy. The special topic to be considered is Rule *versus* Discretion.

PROFESSOR GEORGE STUART FULLERTON closed his lectures as the first Columbia exchange professor at the University of Vienna on February 21. After the final lecture, the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty made an address in which he announced that Professor Fullerton had been nominated honorary professor by the faculty, and closed with these words: "I am glad to be able to inform you that yesterday the Emperor confirmed your nomination as honorary professor. You are hereby given the continued right to lecture at our University, and I may express the wish that you will frequently make use of it. In this spirit, let me say *auf Wiedersehen*."